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RECENT DECISIONS
(1892); Greenville Nat. Bank v. Evans-Snider-Buel Co., 9 Okla. 353, 60 Pac.
249 (1900) ; Cobb v. Buswell, 37 Vt. 337 (1864).
Some states following the majority rule provide that foreign mortgages must
be filed within a reasonable time or a specified time in order to preserve the
foreign lien. In Finney v. Dryden, 214 Ala. 370, 108 So. 13 (1926), a mortgage in
one state, on a horse removed to Alabama, and not recorded therein within three
months after removal, as required by the Code, was held inoperative against the
lien of the defendant for training and developing the horse without notice of
the mortgage. A similar result was reached where the foreign mortgagee did
not discover the presence of the mortgaged automobile, in West Virginia, until
sixty days after the expiration of the three month period provided for the re-
cording of chattel mortgages on property located in that state. Southern Finance
Co. v. Zegar, 120 W.Va. 420, 198 S.E. 875 (1938).
JAMEs D. GHiARD .
Domestic Relations-Breach of Promise to Marry-Effect of Statute Abol-
ishing "Heart Balm" Actions When Complaint Alleges Fraud.-A resident of
the State of New York brought an action in the District Court of Eastern
Pennsylvania against a resident of Pennsylvania alleging pecuniary loss as a re-
sult of her reliance on the defendant's false representations of an intention to
marry her. The defendant made a motion, in view of the New- York (and
Pennsylvania) statutes abolishing causes of action for damages for breach of
contract to marry, that the complaint should be dismissed. Plaintiff contended
that her claim was not one of contract predicated on "breach of promise" but an
action based on fraud and deceit and thus not within the statutory prohibition.
Held, motion granted. The policy of the New York Act is broader than its
letter; since the judicial process in the field of "heart-balm" claims had become
an instrument of extortion, the legislature saw fit to prevent court relief. A
breach of promise action based on fraud and deceit is barred, therefore, when
used to circumvent the statutory prohibition. A. B. v. C. D., 9 U.S.L. Week 2389,
36 F. Supp. 85 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
This holding helps to clear any doubt that may have existed as to the scope
of the New York Act which also abolished rights of action for damages for
alienation of affections, criminal conversation, and seduction. NEw YoRx Civim
PRAcTIcE AcT (1935) Ch. 263, § 61-a et seq. Similar statutes were enacted in
several other states at about the same time: Ind. Laws (1935) Ch. 208; ILL.
REv. STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) Ch. 38, § 246; Ala. Gen. Acts (1935)
P. 70; Mich. Laws (1935) Ch. 266, § 14497; N. J. Laws (1935) Ch. 279; Pa.
Laws (1935) Title 48, § 171; Colo. Laws (1937) Ch. 111; VERNIER, AmFMxcAN
FAMILY LAws (1938 Supp.) § 5, p. 403. The Massachusetts Act abolished only
the action for breach of contract to marry. MAss. GEN. LAws (1938) Ch. 207,
§47A.
The New York statute abolishing actions for seduction and breach of prom-
ise to marry does not violate the constitutional prohibition against legislative
impairment of contracts, since that prohibition is aimed only at commercial con-
tracts. Fearon v. Treanor, 248 App. Div. 225, 228 N.Y. Supp. 368 (1936) ; affirmed,
272 N.Y. 268, 5 N.E. (2d) 815 (1936) ; appeal dismissed, 301 U.S. 667, 57 Sup. Ct.
933 (1937). The sections of the statute abolishing actions for alienation of
affections and criminal conversation were held not to be violative of the due
process clause of the Constitution's 14th Amendment. Hangfarn v. Mark, 274
N.Y. 22, 8 N.E. (2d) 47 (1937); appeal dismissed, 302 U.S. 641, 58 Sup. Ct. 57
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(1937). Also, the provision barring enforcement of accrued causes of action
named in the section unless commenced within 60 days after effective date of
statute, held not objectionable as denying due process where applied to a wife's
pre-existing cause of action for alienation of husband's affections. Vanderbilt v.
Hegenman, 248 N.Y. Supp. 586, 157 Misc. 908 (1937).
The court in the principal case construed the statute to cover all claims for
the kinds of damages sought in heart-balm actions. It reasoned that the complaint
in question, although tortious in form, was contractual in essence. It previously
had been held that the statute applied where the plaintiff alleged fraud in that the
defendant induced her to promise to marry him by falsely representing that he
was single. Even though it was impossible for him legally to fulfill his agreement,
he became bound by contract to perform his promise or pay damages for its
breach. In that case the court recognized the section of the New York Act
which provided that the statute shall be "liberally construed to effectuate the
objects and purposes thereof and the public policy of the state as hereby
declared." Sulkowski v. Szcewczyk, 255 App. Div. 103, 6 N.Y.S. (2d) 97 (1938).
However, it has been held that the statute did not bar an action for damages
resulting from the consummation of a bigamous marriage which the plaintiff
entered into relying on false representations by defendant that he was single,
for the reason that the action was not contrary to the express declaration of
public policy under the statute, since it was in no way based on a breach of
promise, nor -was it subject to abuse by unscrupulous persons. Snyder v. Snyder,
14 N.Y.S. (2d) 815, 172 Misc. 204 (1939). It was held that a secretary's action
brought in New Jersey to recover a portion of her weekly wages, which her
employer had retained with the understanding that they were to be paid to the
secretary on performance of their marriage contract, was an action on the
contract of hire and not an action for damages for breach of promise to marry
and hence was not affected by the statutory prohibition of breach of promise
actions. Glazer v. Klughaupt, 116 N.J.L. 507, 185 Atl. 8 (1936).
Occasionally, before these statutes were enacted, where a promise to marry
had been broken the action was brought in tort rather than contract. In Pollock
v. Sullivan, 53 Vt. 507, 33 Am. Rep. 702 (1881), the court declared that the
wrong was not that the plaintiff had not obtained a husband, but that she spent
time and money in preparation for the marriage relying on defendant's misrepre-
sentation and therefore had a claim for damages in tort. Similarly, the allega-
tion in a counter-claim that the promise was induced by false representations
as to plaintiff's financial ability and business position was held to constitute a
good cause of action for fraud. Gross v. Hochstim, 72 Misc. 343, 130 N.Y.
Supp. 315 (1911). In a situation similar to Snyder v. Snyder, supra, it was held
that a cause of action for fraud existed. Sears v. Wegner, 150 Mich. 388, 114
N.W. 224 (1907).
French law does not recognize a contract resulting from mutual promises
to marry, but will recognize an action for a breach only when the injury comes
within the definition of the French Tort Law of 1814. Holland and Belgium also
view the breach as a tort only. The German Code of 1900 and the Swiss Code
of 1922, derived from the Canon Law theory that the bethrothal is a status which
carries duties of present conduct as well as an obligation to enter the marriage
in the future, view the transaction as contractual in nature. Paul Weidenbaum,
Breach of Prmise in Private International Law, 14 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 451.
Since the earliest English cases were brought in assumpsit, Anglo-American law
has considered the action to be in contract. Stretcher v. Parker, 1 Rolle Abr., 22
P1. 20 (1638) ; Holt v. Ward, 2 Stra. 937 (1732) ; Prescott v. Guyler, 32 Ill. 312
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(1877) ; Caininerer v. Muller, 14 N.Y. Supp. 511, 133 N.Y. 623, 30 N.E. 1147
(1892). Yet the courts have admittedly applied tort rules as the measure of dam-
ages regardless of the form of the complaint. McKane v. Howard, 202 N.Y. 181,
95 N.E. 642 (1911) ; Blattinacher v. Saal, 29 Barb. 22 (N.Y. 1W8) ; Dauphin v.
Landigran, 187 Wis. 633, 205 N.W. 557 (1925); McQuillan v. Evans, 353 Ill. 239,
187 N.E. 320 (1933). Even though in form this action is a contract action, it has
been said to be one arising from the personal conduct of the defendant and affect-
ing the personality of the plaintiff. Finlay v. Chirnay, 20 Q.B. 494 (1888). Also, in
Grubb v. Suit, 32 Grat. 203 (Va., 1879) the court, in denying the right of action
based on assumpsit against an executor, said that although a contract is in-
volved, it is essentially a tort to the person and comes so fully within the reason
and influence of the principles governing actions ex delicto it is impossible to
distinguish them. VERNIER, AmxaMcAx FAMILY LAWS (1931) § 10.
It is evident, therefore, that the plaintiff who frames his complaint on a
tort basis, as in the principal case, has no more reason to escape the statutory
prohibition than one who alleges a breach of contract.
PHILIP W. GRossMAN, JR.
Master and Servant-Master's Liability to Wife of Servant for Tort Com-
mitted by Husband in the Course of His Employment.-Plaintiff was injured
through the negligent acts of her husband, an employee of the defendant. In an
action for damages for these injuries the only question was whether, since she
could not sue her husband in tort, a wife might recover from her husband's
employer for injuries received as a result of the negligence of her husband,
acting within the scope of his employment. Held, that to make the employer
liable because of the acts of its agent, against whom no liability exists in favor
of the person injured, would result in holding the defendant liable notwith-
standing plaintiff's inability to have legal redress against the person causing
her injuries. Also, it would result in permitting the wife to do indirectly that
which she could not do directly, since if defendant is liable to plaintiff, it may
sue and recover against her husband, the actual wrongdoer. Riegger v. Bruton
Brewing Co., 9 U. S. L. WEEK-2294, 16 A. (2d) 99 (Md. 1940).
This is a subject upon which there is a distinct split of authority, and arises
most often in automobile cases, where the husband is driving the defendant's
car, and the wife, plaintiff, is a passenger. Those jurisdictions which deny the
wife recovery say that the employer's liability depends on that of the servant.
Unless the servant is liable there can be no liability on the part of the master.
And where the only negligence alleged against the employer is that of the
servant, the former is not liable as a joint wrongdoer, since he did nothing
except through his employee, but his liability arises because of his responsibility
for the acts of his servant. But since the wife may not sue her husband, there
is no liability on his part, and thus, the servant not being liable, there is no
liability on the part of the master. Maine v. James Maine & Sons Co., 198 Iowa
1278, 201 N.W. 20, 37 A.L.R. 161 (1924) ; Riser v. Riser, 240 Mich. 402, 215 N.W.
290 (1927). These jurisdictions also use the reasoning that was used in the
principal case, that if the wife could sue the employer, he, in turn, could sue the
husband, since the employee is liable to the employer in such cases, and the wife
would then simply be doing indirectly that which she could not do directly. Emer-
son v. Western Seed and Irrigation Co., 116 Neb. 180, 216 N.W. 297, 56 A.L.R.
327 (1927).
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